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Abstract: Due to differences in financial sophistication and agency relationships, we posit that investors use
different criteria to select portfolio managers in the retail mutual fund and fiduciary pension fund industry
segments. We provide evidence on investors’ manager selection criteria by estimating the relation between
manager asset flow and performance. We find that pension fund clients use quantitatively sophisticated
measures like Jensen’s alpha, tracking error, and outperformance of a market benchmark. Pension clients also
punish poorly performing managers by withdrawing assets under management. In contrast, mutual fund
investors use raw return performance and flock disproportionately to recent winners but do not withdraw
assets from recent losers. Mutual fund manager flow is significantly positively related to Jensen’s alpha, a
seemingly anomalous result in light of a relatively unsophisticated mutual fund client base. We provide
preliminary evidence, however, that this relation is driven by a high correlation between Jensen’s alpha and
widely available summary performance measures, such as Morningstar’s star rating. By documenting
differences in the flow-performance relation, we contribute to the growing literature linking fund manager
behavior to the implicit incentives to increase assets under management. We show that several forces combine
to weaken the incentive for pension fund managers to engage in the type of risk-shifting behavior identified
in the mutual fund literature.
JEL classification: G2, G1, L1
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The mutual fund and pension fund segments of the money management industry are similar in many basic
ways. Both deliver portfolio management services to its clients; choose investments from the same universe of
risky assets; and employ both passive and active fund managers.  Due to the expansion of the mutual fund
segment over the past decade, they are also comparable in terms of total assets under management and the total
number of portfolio products.
1  One important difference in these two industry segments, however, is their
disparate clienteles. The typical retail mutual fund investor differs substantially from the typical pension trustee in
their investment needs and financial background. As a result, these two client types are likely to use different
criteria when selecting a money manager. Because portfolio managers are typically compensated as a
percentage of assets under management, they have strong incentives to focus their efforts on attracting clients,
delivering the dimension of performance or service that results in increased assets. To better understand these
implicit incentives deriving from client behavior, we analyze whether differences in client characteristics between
these two segments translate into differences in the relation between manager asset flow and performance.
Our work builds on earlier papers by Sirri and Tufano (1998), Ippolito (1992), and Patel, Zeckhauser
and Hendricks (1994) who present evidence that a flow-performance relation exists in the mutual fund segment.
We focus on two main differences in client characteristics across the two industry segments: financial
sophistication and the existence of agency problems.  Using a compilation of survey evidence, practitioner
sources, and academic studies, we argue that pension fund sponsors are more financially sophisticated than
mutual fund investors. In addition, we show that several aspects of the typical pension manager selection
process can be interpreted as resulting from the layers of agency relationships inherent in the pension segment.
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), in an overview of the less studied pension fund segment,  argue that
pension sponsor officials as fiduciaries have agency problems that induce them to value manager characteristics
that are easily justified to superiors or a trustee committee. The mutual fund segment is quite different in that
mutual fund clients invest only on their own behalf.
We document several differences in the relation between flow and manager characteristics consistent
with these fundamental client differences. First, we find that pension fund sponsors appear to be more2
quantitatively sophisticated than mutual fund investors. For example, pension manager flow is significantly
positively related to risk-adjusted performance measures, such as Jensen's alpha, and negatively related to
tracking error, a measure of diversifiable risk.  Surprisingly, the relation with tracking error is most pronounced
for pension managers that outperform their benchmark, indicating that sponsors punish managers who take on
diversifiable risk, even if it results in outperformance. Mutual fund manager flow, on the other hand, is unrelated
to tracking error and has a strong relation with unadjusted raw return performance. We do find, however, a
significant positive relation between mutual fund manager flow and Jensen’s alpha. This result, while consistent
with the empirical findings in the previous literature, is anomalous in light of the differences in client sophistication
between the two segments. We provide evidence suggesting that the strong statistical relation between mutual
fund flow and Jensen’s alpha is driven by a high correlation between alpha and widely-available summary
performance measures, such as Morningstar’s star rating.  In particular, when Morningstar star ratings are
included as an additional explanatory variable in mutual fund manager flow regressions, alpha is no longer
significant.
Second, we find that pension sponsors appear to prefer manager characteristics that can be justified ex-
post to a trustee committee.  For example, we find that beating a market benchmark attracts an additional
$165.54 million in flow to the average pension manager and boosts his asset growth rate by 20 percentage
points. Furthermore, we find that it is whether or not a manager beats a benchmark that is important; the
magnitude of the excess returns is not significantly related to flow.  In contrast, we find that mutual fund manager
flow is primarily positively related to the magnitude of the excess returns, and especially pronounced at the top
of the performance distribution. This suggests that beating a benchmark is a discrete event in the pension
segment, possibly because it serves to validate the manager’s competence. Alternatively, sponsors may simply
use the beating of a benchmark as a low-cost screening mechanism to narrow the field of managers under
consideration for hire.  We also find that the relation between manager flow and performance is much noisier in
the pension fund segment. This supports the characterization of that segment as relatively more individualized
and influenced by non-performance manager characteristics.
Consistent with previous research, the mutual fund flow-performance relation is highly convex, implying
that mutual fund investors disproportionately flock to good performers, but do not punish poor performers by
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
1 The 1995  Pensions and Investments magazine Top 1000 money managers issue covered 7953 pension fund products
collectively controlling $3.1 trillion.  In the same year, ICI’s Mutual Fund Factbook lists 5357 mutual funds controlling $2.13
withdrawing assets. In contrast, the flow-performance relation is approximately linear in the pension fund
segment. Pension sponsors withdraw assets from managers with poor alpha performance, as well as allocate
flow toward good performers. By documenting differences in the flow-performance relation, we contribute to
the growing literature linking fund manager behavior to their implicit incentives to increase assets under
management. The shape of the flow-performance relation in the mutual fund industry implies that winners take all
in this segment. As a result of the convexity in rewards, mutual fund managers have an implicit incentive to alter
the risk of their portfolios to increase the chances that they are among the winners. Brown, Harlow, and Starks
(1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) find empirical support for this prediction. In contrast, we show that
several forces combine to weaken the incentive for pension fund managers to engage in this same type of risk-
shifting behavior. In addition to the lack of convexity in the flow-performance relation and the withdrawal of
assets for poor performance, pension fund sponsors appear to explicitly punish this type of behavior through
their punishment of high tracking error and tendency to fire managers who substantially deviate from their stated
investment policies.
Our comparison of pension fund and mutual fund managers provides new insights into previous studies
that focus only on mutual funds. In stark contrast to the high degree of autocorrelation in mutual fund flows, we
find that pension fund flows exhibit very little autocorrelation. We explore reasons why the autocorrelation of
flows appears to be a result unique to mutual funds, and not a universal characteristic of managed funds. In
addition, we find large and robust differences in the role of asset size in attracting flow. Large mutual funds
attract flow approximately in proportion to their size.  In contrast, large pension fund managers attract much less
dollar flow than smaller funds, with the top 10% of managers ranked by asset size actually losing assets on
average. We conjecture that these results are also related to differences in agency relationships and
sophistication across the two segments. For example, the high degree of autocorrelation in mutual fund flows
may be driven by the allocation behavior of participants in defined contribution (401k) retirement plans. The
importance of personal relationships and face-to-face contact between pension managers and clients may
induce decreasing returns to scale in this segment, resulting in a negative relation between flow and asset size.
We provide some supporting arguments and preliminary evidence for these conjectures, as well as discuss
implications for managerial incentives.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
trillion in aggregate.4
In a broader sense, this paper also contributes conceptually to the large literature on fund performance
evaluation.  The focus in this literature has traditionally been, “do mutual funds exhibit superior risk-adjusted
performance?” The puzzle of active portfolio management whereby mutual fund managers underperform passive
benchmarks, yet continue to attract assets to manage, may be reconciled by shifting the focus to “do mutual
funds exhibit superior performance in the eyes of their investors?”  Our results suggest that the answers to these
questions might be quite different.
2.  Comparison of the pension fund and mutual fund management industry segments
In a given year there is a fair amount of hiring and firing activity in both the mutual fund and pension fund
industry segments, resulting in a large volume of inflows and outflows. Twenty-nine percent of mutual fund
owners surveyed in 1995 indicated that they had conducted an exchange (transferred out of one fund and into
another within the same mutual fund company) and 14% closed an account. During that same year, 22% of
pension plan sponsors terminated a manager, 28% hired a manager and 15% terminated and hired a manager
within the year.
2
Previous evidence suggests that past performance influences the manager selection and termination
decision, and is thereby an important determinant of flow. Despite different sample periods, methodologies, and
performance measures, Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Gruber (1996), Patel, Zeckhauser, and Hendricks
(1994), Ippolito (1992), and Sirri and Tufano (1998) all find that past performance is an important determinant
of flow in the mutual fund segment. Lakonishok et al (1992) provide some evidence that performance is related
to the growth in the number of clients in the pension fund segment as well. Although these studies establish the
importance of a manager’s track record in determining the amount of assets he controls, there has been
relatively little discussion of which performance measures and manager characteristics matter most.  A careful
comparison of a typical client in the two segments will shed light on how and why the flow-performance relation
is likely to differ across these groups.
                                                                
2 Unless otherwise noted, the sources for the survey information on mutual fund investors comes from various publications
from the Investment Company Institute including:  the 1996 national survey of mutual fund investors The People Behind the
Growth, the 1993 survey Understanding Shareholder’s Redemption Decisions, the 1997 survey Understanding
Shareholder’s Use of Information and Advisors, and the 1996 survey Shareholder Assessment of Risk Disclosure Methods.
(All available at www.ici.org.) Unless otherwise noted, the survey information on pension fund sponsors comes from various
surveys by Greenwich Associates (compiled in Investment Management Report 1996 and 1997).5
As of 1995, the mutual fund segment served more than 30 million households while the pension fund
segment served around 45,000 corporate and public plan sponsors and endowments. The median mutual fund
assets per household is $18,000 while the average pension fund assets is in the range of $67 million.
3
Individuals typically have a much smaller portfolio of managers to monitor: the median household owns three
mutual funds with two different fund families.  The average number of portfolio managers per plan sponsor is
8.9, with plans over $1 billion in assets employing as many as 20 managers. These basic differences imply that a
pension fund manager’s flows will be much more discrete, as the loss or gain of one or two clients may change
assets under management  by  millions of dollars.   In addition, by controlling a large amount of assets pension
fund sponsors have more market power in contracting for portfolio management services than mutual fund
investors. Indeed, Halpern and Fowler (1991) report that fees vary considerably by pension fund client for the
same manager.
The question of interest is how these two very different client pools allocate money to the managers
competing for their assets.  In this section we focus on two client differences that will guide our empirical
analysis of the relation between flow and performance in these two industry segments.
2.1. Client differences: financial sophistication
The typical pension fund client is arguably more financially sophisticated than the typical mutual fund
investor.  Pension fund sponsors are often finance professionals with expertise in the area of investment
management. In addition, most pension sponsors rely heavily on the recommendations of consultants when
deciding which managers to hire or retain. As a result, the performance evaluation measures favored by
consultants likely influence the relation between flow and performance in this segment.  A consultant’s screening
service generally includes a high degree of quantitative analysis including risk-adjusted measures such as
Jensen’s alpha, the Sharpe measure, and tracking error. These measures are commonly found in many of the
available pension manager databases and evaluation software packages. In addition, firms such as BARRA,
Mobius, and Wilshire Associates market software that performs sophisticated return attribution analysis that
decomposes portfolio returns into exposure to various passive indices.
                                                                
3 McGraw-Hill’s 1995 Money Market Directory and the 1995 Directory of Pension Funds and their Investment Managers
(McGraw Hill).6
Tracking error, in particular, is a commonly used measure in this industry segment.  Besides being a
standard measure included in popular client software packages, at least nine articles on tracking error have
appeared since 1992 in the practitioner-oriented Journal of Portfolio Management and Financial Analysts
Journal. Tracking error, a measure of diversifiable risk, measures the volatility of a portfolio’s deviation from
benchmark returns. One performance measure advocated by pension consultants and academic researchers, the
appraisal ratio, uses tracking error as a component.
4  The appraisal ratio is defined as Jensen’s alpha divided by
diversifiable risk (tracking error), and can be interpreted as a benefit-to-cost ratio of an actively managed
portfolio.  The proper application of an appraisal ratio implies that after controlling for alpha, a sponsor should
optimally allocate capital to managers with lower tracking error.
Managers in the pension segment are often selected and evaluated according to their investment style or
specialty. For example, a sponsor may conduct a search for a manager that invests only in large-capitalization
value stocks. As a result, the sponsor would compare a potential manager’s track record to an index of value
stocks or other large-cap value managers. Virtually all pension managers state their investment style and
benchmark when marketing themselves to potential clients.
The more sophisticated (quantitative) methods of risk adjustment and benchmarking that are
commonplace in the pension fund industry do not appear to be common among mutual fund owners.
5  Capon et
al (1996) report that 75% of recent mutual fund purchasers surveyed did not know the investment style of their
funds, and 39.3% did not know whether their fund was a load or no-load fund. When choosing a fund or
monitoring a current investment, mutual fund investors typically rely on sources of investment advice or
information less likely to endorse sophisticated risk-adjusted measures of fund performance. Most use the
media for information: 53% use newspapers, magazines or investment newsletters (most frequently mentioned
are the Wall Street Journal and Money magazine) and only 19% consult a ratings service like Morningstar or
Lipper. According to a 1995 Money magazine poll of mutual fund investors, only 26.7% said they compared
their fund’s return to a benchmark.
6
                                                                
4 For example, see Treynor and Black (1973) and Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (1999), p. 759.
5 Admati and Pfleiderer (1997) present a model in which tying manager compensation directly, or indirectly through flow, to
observed benchmark-adjusted performance does not lead to optimal portfolios, or aligned incentives between the manager and
client. Nevertheless, we refer to the use of benchmarks as sophisticated in the sense that they are quantitative measures
endorsed by pension consultants and portfolio theory.
6 “Why Funds Don’t Beat the Market,” Money (August 1995, pp. 58-67)7
A confounding factor in a characterization of mutual fund investors as unsophisticated is that 59% of
mutual fund owners consult with a financial advisor such as a broker or financial planner before purchasing
mutual funds. In addition, fund recommendations in newspapers and magazines are typically based on
performance measures that incorporate some form of risk adjustment. Many fund advertisements feature
Morningstar star ratings based on fund rankings on both risk and return. Together, these factors may implicitly
introduce an element of more sophisticated decision making into the fund selection process. However, the
magnitude of this effect is an empirical question.
These differences in the level of client financial sophistication suggest that different performance
measures may be important in each industry segment. We expect flow in the pension fund segment to be related
to risk-adjusted measures of performance such as Jensen’s alpha, tracking error, and style-adjusted returns.
Flow in the mutual fund segment is likely to be more closely related to raw returns and summary performance
measures, such as popular rankings like Morningstar “stars.”
2.2. Client differences: the manager selection process and agency issues
Relative to the mutual fund segment, manager selection is often a lengthy and costly process for pension
sponsors. Many retain consultants such as Wilshire Associates, Frank Russell, or RogersCasey to monitor the
performance of current managers and make hiring and firing recommendations. Greenwich Associates reports
that “for every manager actually selected by the average fund, 22 are screened by pension fund consultants, 16
complete a written questionnaire, 5 are interviewed personally, and 4 reach the final set.   Thus, a strong track
record is only a starting point in attracting clients as presumably only those with good records make it to the
interview stage of the process.
Survey and anecdotal evidence suggest that non-performance manager characteristics such as
personality, credibility, reputation, and attentiveness are very important in the ultimate hiring and retention
decision. For example, 25% of plan sponsors listed a “lack of credibility with investment committee or trustees”
as the reason for termination of their manager. According to scoring sheets from CalPERS’ recent manager
search, only ten points out of 550 were allocated to performance for those managers making it past the initial
screening, while 150 points were allocated to the “investment committee interview.”
7  Most sponsors frequently
meet one-on-one with their managers to ask questions, examine holdings, and assess performance. For8
example, 78% of sponsors meet at least once a year with the most important managers and apparently value
personal contact highly.
8  Overall, the picture emerging from this industry segment is that manager characteristics
unobservable to a researcher play an important role in attracting pension assets. In contrast, mutual fund
investors have little opportunity for personal contact with portfolio managers, and are more likely to rely on a
track record or a fund analyst’s report to guide their decision. Even Morningstar inputs only quantitative
variables into its star ratings even though they are clearly influential enough to gain access to fund management.
It is not clear why pension sponsors rely so heavily on hired consultants and qualitative characteristics
when choosing a portfolio manager. One view is that hiring an expert to screen the universe of managers based
on quantitative performance measures, and then evaluating finalists on qualitative variables, is a cost-effective
method of judiciously monitoring large sums of pension liabilities. Perhaps sponsors are better able to discern
aspects of manager skill and predict future performance from face-to-face meetings than through past
performance alone. Alternatively, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) argue that these practices can be
interpreted as evidence of an agency problem.
The majority of pension fund assets are in defined benefit plans, where typically a corporate treasurer,
as a fiduciary, is responsible for investing the pension assets.
9  Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue
that an agency problem between senior corporate management, the corporate treasurer, and the outside
portfolio managers can account for many facts about the pension fund segment. Specifically, since the corporate
treasurer must answer to senior management in the event of inferior plan performance, he may choose managers
and strategies that reduce his own job risk. As a result, he may tend to choose strategies where blame can be
easily transferred to others and his decisions can be defended ex-post.  For example, Lakonishok, et al argue
that the common practices of externally managing pension assets and hiring professional pension consultants are
popular because they provide convenient scapegoats in the event of an unpleasant outcome.
10
Under this agency interpretation, we expect that sponsors value manager characteristics that reduce a
corporate treasurer’s job risk.   For example, outperforming a market benchmark may be convincing evidence
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
7 http://www.calpers.ca.gov/invest/invest.htm
8 According to a Nelson/Wilshire poll, a recent trend toward the introduction of client service personnel to interact with
sponsors in place of the portfolio management team is viewed negatively by 65% of the plan sponsors surveyed.
9 According to Greenwich Associates, 86% of corporate pensions managed 63.2% of their pension assets via defined benefit
plans in 1994.
10 Eighty-six percent of pension plans surveyed by Greenwich Associates managed less than 5% internally in 1994. Sixty
percent of pension plans surveyed by Greenwich Associates used the services of a pension fund consultant in 1994 and 84%
of those used their consultant to monitor current managers in addition to providing other services.9
of competency to trustees, even if the manager was not a top performer among peer managers.  Indeed, a
recent survey of sponsors ranked performance relative to market indices as more important than the investment
performance of other managers.
11   In this environment, managers who take concentrated bets on stocks and
consequently deviate substantially from market benchmarks take a risk of being “wrong and alone.”
12   Tracking
error captures this idea because it dynamically measures the volatility of a portfolio’s deviation from benchmark
returns.  Bernstein (1998) discusses this issue, stating that “clients love affair with benchmarks has made large
tracking errors extremely perilous for [pension] managers.”  Thus, client attention to tracking error can be
interpreted as the result of agency problems because it focuses on the cost of manager bets that deviate from the
benchmark, while ignoring the potential benefit in terms of increased return.
Differences in the manager selection and evaluation processes in the pension fund and mutual fund
segments suggest three differences in the relation between flow and performance.  First, tracking error and
performance relative to a market index are likely to be related to pension fund flows and not mutual fund flows,
both because of agency reasons and because of their reliance on sophisticated concepts like benchmarking.  In
addition to being less quantitative, mutual fund investors do not need to justify hiring decisions to superiors or
beneficiaries.
Second, we should observe lower explanatory power of quantitative performance measures in
explaining  flow in the pension fund segment, because qualitative manager characteristics are generally more
important to pension fund sponsors than to mutual fund investors.
13  Note that this does not necessarily
contradict the notion that pension sponsors are more quantitatively sophisticated than mutual fund investors.  A
weak statistical relation may suggest that sponsors use quantitative measures primarily as a first screen, or as a
supplement to qualitative manager characteristics.  If pension sponsors are more sophisticated, however, then
those performance measures that are related to flow should be the risk-adjusted and quantitative variety, and
not raw returns.   Finally, differences in the attention paid to monitoring managers suggest that pension fund
                                                                
11 “Time Horizons of Pension Fund Managers,” by Financial Executives Research Foundation, 1993.
12 Mark Kritzman, “Wrong and Alone,” Economics & Portfolio Strategy  (New York: Peter L. Bernstein, Inc. :1998)
13 We recognize that non-performance factors such as fund reputation or services may be important to mutual fund investors
as well. However, they are unlikely to greatly weaken the cross-sectional relation between flow and performance because
reputation in the mutual fund industry is largely based on marketing, which also tends to focus on performance. In addition,
there is a great deal of homogeneity in services offered across fund complexes, implying little cross-sectional dispersion along
this dimension.10
sponsors are more likely to punish poorly performing managers by withdrawing assets than mutual fund
investors.
3. Description of the sample
3.1.  Pension fund sample
Data on pension fund money managers are from the June 1995 M-Search Database compiled and
distributed by Mobius, Inc. This database contains numerous firm and manager characteristics for 1320
management firms offering approximately 4500 portfolio products over the period 1985 to 1994. Each
management firm typically offers more than one investment product, each with a given style or objective. As in
studies of the mutual fund industry, the unit of analysis is the individual fund product (e.g., the analog of Fidelity
Magellan). Although other terms such as “fund” or “product” are often used, we will refer to this unit of analysis
as the fund manager.
For each manager we have an annual time-series of assets under management and the number of distinct
clients, and quarterly returns. Assets and client numbers are broken down by tax treatment of the client account
(tax-exempt, taxable) so that we are able to isolate the flows from tax-exempt, fiduciary clients. Tax-exempt
clients, who control approximately 88% of total sample assets, include university endowments and non-profit
foundations in addition to public and corporate pension sponsors. We collectively refer to this client group as
pension fund sponsors.
The Mobius database is sold primarily to sponsors to aid in selecting and monitoring portfolio managers.
Managers do not pay to be included in M-Search, and Mobius does not provide any consulting services for
manager selection or evaluation. A typical use of the Mobius database is to do an initial screening of managers
with a certain investment style. The data are provided to Mobius via self-reported manager surveys.  While this
may cause some concern regarding the quality of the data, management firms do have an incentive to provide
Mobius with complete, accurate, and timely information. Managers have an incentive to be complete since M-
Search screens will exclude a manager from a search if data are missing.  They arguably have an incentive to be
accurate, since clients may check the data of the managers who make their final screen against alternative
sources (e.g., Nelson’s Directory of Investment Managers, Pensions and Investments, private consultants,11
etc).
14   Finally, they have an incentive to be timely since Mobius will drop a firm after failing to report returns for
three consecutive quarters.
To focus on a set of relatively homogeneous managers, we analyze only active domestic equity
managers who invest according to a growth, value, or general equity investment style. As a result, we exclude all
non-equity, international, and passive index managers. Investment style is determined as of December 1994,
and applied to the historical data for each manager. We use product names and supplementary manager-
supplied style information on M-Search to assign each pension fund manager to a style category. Using a similar
style classification on this same data set, Horan (1998) reports that the Mobius growth and value style
categories are consistent with a classification using loadings on the Fama-French book-to-market factor
(HML).
Due to data requirements and quality reasons, we impose four additional screens. First, because we use
three-year performance measures in our empirical tests we require portfolio returns to be available for three
consecutive years. Most pension sponsors and consultants require the existence of a three-year performance
track record to be considered in the initial phases of a manager search. Second, we require returns to be total
returns, including cash holdings, gross of management fees. We analyze gross returns because they are reported
more frequently than net returns, resulting in a larger sample, and because, unlike the mutual fund industry, fees
vary considerably by client.
15  Third, we require each set of returns to be the composite of all fully discretionary
portfolios managed by the firm in a given style, including the performance of any portfolios terminated during the
measurement period. This ensures that the analyzed returns measure the manager’s actual performance, as
opposed to the performance of a self-selected “representative” composite of his portfolio.
16  Finally, to increase
                                                                
14  Nelson’s Directory is a comprehensive print directory based on the survey responses of approximately 2500 money
management firms with U.S. institutional clients, including those firms based outside of the U.S. To check the accuracy of our
data, we compared a subsample to numbers presented in Nelson’s directory. Ninety percent of this subsample either matched
exactly or were within 10% of the values reported in Nelson’s. In addition, Coggin and Trzcinka (1995) report that checks of the
Mobius data against the March 1993 PIPER database confirmed the accuracy of the Mobius data.
15 Other studies of pension fund manager performance such as Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Coggin, Fabozzi,
and Rahman (1993) also use returns gross of fees. Christopherson, Ferson, and Glassman (1998) conduct their tests using
returns gross of fees, and with an estimate of fees subtracted out. As we describe later, our solution to the issue of
comparability of mutual fund and pension fund managers is to add back fees and expenses to mutual fund returns to check the
robustness of the results.
16  In most cases, the composite is the market-value weighted average of portfolios managed in a given style. In a few
instances, an equally weighted composite was used when market-value weighted composite returns were unavailable.12
the precision of our tests we exclude managers that control less than $20 million in tax-exempt assets.
17  These
restrictions leave a final sample of 562 pension fund managers from 388 management firms, for a total of 2,461
manager-year observations over the 1987 to 1994 period. These 562 managers control assets that aggregate to
$634 billion at the end of 1994, which represents 47% of the 1994 actively managed domestic equity industry
assets according to figures from the 1996 Nelson’s Directory.
Data availability limits us to analyzing only annual measures of flow, which implies that we effectively
ignore the short-term dynamics of investment and redemption behavior. However, while managers are clearly
affected by daily and weekly flows that require efficient cash management, it is not clear that the overall industry
picture that we are studying here would benefit from higher frequency flow measurement. For example, monthly
flows are largely due to sponsor-specific cash needs and the desire to rebalance the overall sponsor portfolio,
and less likely to be due to the hiring and firing of managers for performance reasons. In addition, most other
cross-sectional studies of the flow-performance relation use annual data, so this allows us to better compare our
results.
3.2.  Mutual fund sample
All data on mutual fund managers are from Morningstar, Inc.’s July 1995 Mutual Funds OnDisc. By
using the same data availability criteria and screens described above, we arrive at a sample of 483 mutual fund
managers in 352 different fund families for a total of 2,676 manager-years. Specifically, we require the funds to
be all-equity mutual funds in the growth, value, or domestic equity styles with three years of consecutive returns
data.  We also exclude funds that are closed to new investors and institutional funds that have investment
minimums greater than $25,000.  In addition, we exclude the manager-years where the fund merged with
another fund, since the flow measures may be distorted.
18   We restrict our sample to annual observations in the
period from 1987 to 1994 to be directly comparable to the pension fund sample.  Our final sample of 483
managers aggregate to $389 billion at the end of 1994, which represents approximately 55% of the 1994
domestic equity mutual fund industry assets according to figures from the 1996 Mutual Fund Factbook.
  We use
                                                                
17 For example, the standard deviation of percentage flow is 40 times greater in the sample funds with less than $20 million in
assets than in the rest of the sample.
18 We thank Judy Chevalier for providing a list of merged mutual funds and merger dates. We supplemented this list with the
list of fund mergers in Wiesenberger to completely cover the 1987-1994 period.13
the Morningstar-assigned style code (nine categories broken down by market capitalization and by growth,
value, or blend) to classify mutual funds into style categories similar to those in the pension fund sample. As in
the pension manager sample, investment style is determined as of December 1994 and applied to the historical
data for each manager. Chan, Chen, and Lakonishok (1998) report that the mutual funds in their sample
generally had consistent styles over time.
3.3. Potential biases
Our sample of fund managers contains only the firms existing or included in the Mobius or Morningstar
databases as of June 1995. If poorly performing firms and/or managers have dropped out of the database
during the sample period, this may induce survivorship bias. Several recent studies, including Grinblatt and
Titman (1989), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Malkiel (1995), Carhart (1995), and Elton, Gruber, and Blake
(1996), have confirmed the economic significance of survivorship bias in equity mutual fund performance
studies. We are not aware of any evidence on survivorship bias in the pension fund segment, but we have
reason to believe that it is less prevalent in the data than for the mutual fund segment.
19  More importantly, three
studies have confirmed that survivorship bias does not affect inferences on the flow-performance relation. Sirri
and Tufano (1998), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and Goetzmann and Peles (1997) repeat their analyses on
samples free of survivorship bias and report no changes in inferences.
Finally, because managers join the databases at different times in their history (i.e., not just when the
fund starts up initially), our results may also suffer from back-fill bias. For example, managers may have a
greater incentive to volunteer information to Mobius after a period of good performance. Since Mobius began
selling its database in 1989, the number of covered manager products has grown by 500%. Again, however,
any survivorship or back-fill bias is likely to be less severe in our study of the relation between flow and
performance than in a study that attempts to characterize the average performance of fund managers.
3.4. Measures of flow and performance
                                                                
19 Not all managers deleted from Mobius are poor performers. According to sources at Mobius, managers are also deleted from
the Mobius database when they are successful and closing to new clients, or when they do not find Mobius to be a
productive source of client contacts. Also, due to the importance of client contact and servicing discussed in Section 2, poor
performance is not the sole reason for a firm to go out of business in the pension fund segment.  To assess the potential
severity of the survivorship bias in our sample we obtained from Mobius a list of firms deleted in 1995. Of 89 deleted firms we
were able to find 71 (80%) listed in Nelson’s 1995 Directory indicating that they had not gone out of business, but were
dropped from the database for other reasons.  Of these, 31 (35%) were also listed in Nelson’s 1996 Directory. Of those with
return data for 1993, the 1993 return distribution for the sample and deleted groups are not statistically different.14
We analyze three measures of net manager flows. The first is the annual net dollar flow in or out of a
fund, defined as the annual change in total net assets minus appreciation.
Flowit  =  TNAit – TNAit-1 (1 + Rit)
 The second measure, net percentage flow, scales net dollar flow by the total net assets in year t-1 and
can be interpreted as an asset growth rate net of appreciation. In robustness checks, we also analyze the
percentage change in the number of pension clients as an alternative measure of flow. Client data are useful for
studying the more discrete pension fund flows, where gaining or losing one client results in millions of dollars in
flow.
While most previous papers in the mutual fund flow-performance literature have analyzed only
percentage flows, we focus on the dollar measure. Conceptually, the dollar flow measure more precisely
addresses our question of interest, “what drives investment dollars across the two industry segments?” As noted
in previous studies, however, percentage flow may be preferable when dollar flow is positively related to fund
size, whereby larger funds attract higher flows regardless of performance. While there is indeed a strong positive
empirical relation between dollar flows and fund size in the mutual fund segment, the pension fund segment
displays the opposite relation. The univariate correlation between fund size and dollar flow is a statistically
significant -0.314. Controlling for a potential size effect in a multiple regression format, rather than by scaling the
flows, preserves this information for analysis. We address possible reasons behind the different flow-size
relation across the industry segments in Section 4.5, and we note in the text any instances where results differ
across the two flow measures.
There are many issues that surface when deciding on a set of performance measures to study. The
performance evaluation literature is large, and there is considerable debate as to which measures are most
appropriate. Since a goal of this paper is to infer which measures are important to clients in each industry
segment, we focus on the measures suggested by our study of client characteristics outlined in Section 2.
Specifically, measures expected to be important to pension sponsors as a result of their financial sophistication,
use of consultants, and potential agency problems include: performance relative to the S&P 500 market
benchmark, style-adjusted performance, tracking error, and risk-adjusted measures such as a one-factor
Jensen’s alpha. Measures expected to be important to mutual fund investors include historical raw returns and
summary rankings within their style objective (a proxy for media rankings). All of these performance measures15
are annualized, and lagged so as to be observable to the client before a hiring decision is made. The appendix
defines these variables.
3.5. Comparative summary statistics
Table 1 contains manager-year statistics that highlight some of the basic similarities and differences
across the two segments. The distribution in assets under management indicates skewness in both segments, but
there are clearly larger asset pools in the pension manager sample. As mentioned earlier, pension manager flows
are expected to be relatively lumpy, as the median number of client accounts is only 14 versus 12,609 for
mutual fund managers. Combining these client statistics with the median assets under management in each
industry implies that the typical pension client has a $21 million investment with the median manager, while the
typical mutual fund client has $13,000.
Comparing the flow distributions provide the first indication that there are interesting differences
between the two industries. Although both distributions are centered approximately at zero, the tails appear to
be quite different. Consistent with previous studies, the distribution of mutual fund flows appears to be
asymmetric. The top 5% experience net inflows nearly three times larger than the outflows at the bottom 5%
($302 million in inflows versus $109 million in outflows). In contrast, the distribution of pension manager flows is
more symmetric; the bottom 5% of pension managers actually suffer larger dollar outflows than the top 5%
gains, $524 million in outflows versus $400 million in inflows. These statistics, along with the results of Sirri and
Tufano (1998) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997), suggest that the shape of the flow-performance relation may
differ in the two industries. We explore this possibility in section 5.
Unlike the flow distributions, the distributions of performance measures are similar, especially if returns
are measured gross of management fees for both segments (not reported). We also find that the distribution of
manager-years in the broad domestic equity, growth and value style categories is roughly similar in both
samples. Panels B and C of Table 1 contain pairwise correlation coefficients of our flow and performance
variables, estimated separately for each industry segment.  The pairwise correlations between performance
variables are not high enough to cause concern over multicollinearity problems in our regressions.
4. Relating flow and performance in the two industry segments16
In section 2 we argue that differences in the typical client in the mutual fund and pension fund segments
imply differences in the relation between flow and performance. In this section, we test for these differences
using a linear regression framework relating both dollar and percentage cross-sectional flows, pooled over eight
years, to lagged performance measures.  In addition to control variables for asset size, fund age, and lagged
flow, we include a set of sixteen time-style interaction dummies, one for each year and style combination. For
example, V88 = 1 if this observation is a value manager in the year 1988, and 0 otherwise. This specification fits
a separate intercept for each year-style category of the data. The time component of the interaction term picks
up any cross-sectional correlations in the observations due to differing average flows across sample years. The
style component adjusts for the fact that in any given year, growth funds may experience average flow that is
significantly different from that of value funds, or of general equity `funds. Combining the time and style
components adjusts for both of these potential effects. Including this set of interaction terms reduces this source
of correlation in the residuals, mitigates bias, and increases the precision of our estimated coefficients. Several of
the interaction term dummies are significant in all specifications, suggesting that the correction is necessary. In
addition, all t-statistics reported in the tables are based on a correction for heteroskedasticity using the method
of White (1980).
Our hypotheses regarding the expected differences between the flow-performance relation in the two
industry segments imply that some variables should be significant determinants of flow in only one segment (e.g.,
tracking error in the pension segment).  We therefore estimate the flow-performance regressions separately for
each segment, and compare the relations across the two segments. For completeness, we also report in the
tables the results of t-tests comparing the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients across the segments. In
general the t-test results confirm the significance analysis, and as a result, we discuss them only when the results
require explanation. We also conduct numerous robustness checks of the data.
20  For simplicity we report only
the results of the robustness checks that affect our inferences. Thus, all other results can be assumed to be
robust to alternative specifications.
                                                                
20 We repeated our tests using mutual fund returns gross of management fees and expenses (adding annual fees and expenses
back in to annual returns and annual alphas.) For the pension fund sample, we repeated all tests using the percentage change
in number of clients as the dependent variable flow measure. We also repeated our tests after first eliminating the largest 10%
of both samples in asset size; we also analyzed the sample after removing the smallest managers in asset size (<$250 million in
assets).  Finally, we repeated our tests using style-specific (growth, value, and generic domestic equity) benchmarks instead
of only the generic S&P500 benchmark.17
We begin with an analysis of the relative financial sophistication of the two client groups. Next, we
consider the role of performance benchmarks in each industry. Finally, we explore whether the lack of
punishment for poor performance documented for mutual funds extends to the pension fund segment. This has
particular importance for determining the impact of flow on managerial incentives.
4.1.  Which type of performance matters?
Given the relative financial sophistication of pension sponsors, we expect to find that risk-adjusted
performance measures are significantly related to pension manager flow.  Similarly, consistent with previous
research, we expect to observe that unadjusted raw returns explain mutual fund manager flow.  We begin our
analysis with a parsimonious test of this hypothesis that will also allow for comparison with the results in previous
flow-performance studies of mutual funds.  Specifically, for each industry segment we regress flows on lagged
returns, one-factor Jensen’s alpha, and tracking error, pooling eight years of cross-sectional data from 1987-
1994. These regressions also include control variables for asset size, lagged flow, fund age, and time-style
interaction dummies (not reported). Table 2 contains the results of regressions for both dollar and percentage
flows for each industry segment.
Overall, the results in Table 2 provide mixed support for our hypothesis. In the pension fund segment,
both alpha and tracking error have the predicted relation with flows. Specifically, the significant coefficients on
Jensen’s alpha indicate that pension sponsors reward 1% higher alpha performance with an additional $12.7
million in net dollar flow, or 2.3% additional net asset growth. In addition, the coefficients on tracking error are
negative and significant in both the dollar and percentage flow regressions. The signs and significance of these
coefficients are consistent with a sophisticated pension fund clientele. We would not expect tracking error to be
important to mutual fund investors, which is consistent with what we find.
Contrary to our predictions, lagged raw return is significantly related to pension fund manager flow, and
Jensen’s alpha is significantly related to mutual fund manager flow. These results indicate that both unadjusted
and risk-adjusted returns are related to manager flow in both segments.  While this appears inconsistent with our
hypothesis, this test may be too simplistic to draw conclusions. For example, the significance of raw returns for
pension managers may be due to the high correlation between lagged return and lagged return in excess of a
market benchmark. Similarly, the importance of Jensen’s alpha to mutual fund investors may be due to a18
correlation with summary ranking measures, such as Morningstar star ratings.  We provide some evidence
supporting these conjectures in the next sections.
4.2. Do market benchmarks matter?
We argue in Section 2 that performance relative to a benchmark is important to relatively sophisticated
pension clients, but not to mutual fund investors. To test this we use the S&P 500 as the market benchmark for
several reasons. First, industry surveys indicate that 47.1% of pension fund managers actually use the S&P500
as their primary benchmark, while anecdotal evidence and the practitioner literature suggests its use is even
more widespread.
 21   Second, at the expense of dispersion among style categories, we study only three broad
style groups to preserve comparability across segments and focus on clientele differences. While we expect
pension sponsors to evaluate managers according to a style-specific benchmark (e.g., small-cap value), we do
not have information on the actual style benchmark sponsors use to evaluate any of our managers. However,
40% of our pension sample manager-years are in the generic domestic equity objective, and thus the style-
specific and generic (S&P 500) benchmarks coincide for a significant portion of our sample. In addition, the
annual frequency of our data makes it particularly difficult to distinguish the importance of style-specific
benchmarks from the S&P500 due to the high correlation of annual benchmark returns.
22
 Table 3 panels A and B present the results of regressions designed to test the importance of
outperformance of a benchmark in the two industry segments. We make several changes from the specification
in Table 2 in order to investigate two issues. First, we wish to test whether flow is affected by the level of
performance relative to the S&P 500 (excess returns), or by the discrete event of beating the benchmark.
Second, to test for the asymmetric effects of good and poor performance suggested in earlier research, we
estimate the effects of the performance variables separately for managers with returns both above and below the
S&P 500 Index. We do this by creating two dummy variables: OUTP equals 1 if a manager observation
outperformed the S&P500, and equals zero otherwise; UNDERP equals 1 if a manager underperformed the
S&P500, and equals zero otherwise. We then interact these dummies with the continuous performance
measurement variables to arrive at the following specification:
                                                                
21 Nelson’s 1998 Survey of Performance Benchmarks19
   where
i
t Z  is a vector of performance variables, 
i
t TS  is a vector of time-style dummy interactions, and
i
t C  is a vector of control variables. In this setting, the additional flow from outperformance of the S&P 500,
conditional on other performance and control variables, is estimated by  1 b . The additional flow attributable to
performance measures conditional on whether or not the manager outperformed the S&P 500 is estimated
by 2 b  and  3 b , for outperforming and underperforming managers respectively.  This methodology is equivalent
to running two separate regressions for the outperforming and underperforming subsamples of managers, with
the restriction that coefficients on control variables and time-style dummies are identical across the subsamples.
The regressions in Table 3 Panel A support the hypothesis that outperformance of a benchmark is a
discrete event for pension managers. The coefficient on the outperformance dummy is both statistically and
economically significant.  Irrespective of the magnitude of the outperformance, beating a benchmark attracts an
additional $165.54 million to the average pension manager and boosts his asset growth rate by 20 percentage
points.  The insignificant coefficients on excess returns further support the idea that beating a benchmark is an
important, but discrete event. Since the specification in Table 3 effectively separates the sample according to
whether the manager outperformed the S&P 500,  the insignificance of excess returns reveals that, within each
of these subsamples, there is no significant relation between flow and the magnitude of a manager’s raw return.
Thus, these results suggest that the anomalous significance of raw return in the pension fund regression of Table
2 may be due to a “benchmark effect”.
The significance of beating a benchmark has at least two interpretations.  First, the importance of agency
relationships implies that sponsors may prefer a manager that outperforms his benchmark because it is easier to
justify his hire to superiors. In other words, beating a benchmark may provide validation of skill. Alternatively,
since the pension manager hiring process typically involves several stages including an initial performance screen
that narrows the available choices to an acceptable set, it may be that beating a benchmark elevates the
manager to a pool of potential hires. Both explanations imply that pension managers who outperform their
benchmark will have higher average flow, all else equal.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
22 We have also run our specifications substituting style-adjusted performance measures (alphas, tracking errors, excess
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The lack of quantitative sophistication or agency relationships implies that mutual fund flow is unrelated
to a manager’s performance relative to a benchmark. However, since return in excess of a benchmark is highly
correlated with raw return performance (perfectly correlated in each cross-section), we expect excess returns to
be significantly related to mutual fund flows. We find no reason to suspect, however, that the mere presence of
outperformance acts as a discrete event affecting mutual fund flows. Table 3 Panel B presents mixed evidence
related to this issue. The coefficient on OUTP is significantly positive for dollar flow, but insignificantly different
from zero for percentage flow.  In contrast to pension managers, the magnitude of the outperformance is a
significant determinant of flow. The estimated coefficients on excess returns are highly significantly positive, and
similar in magnitude for excess returns both above and below the benchmark.  After conducting additional
diagnostics, we conclude that there is a weak positive effect on mutual fund flow associated with the event of
outperformance of the benchmark, and a much stronger positive effect associated with the magnitude of the
outperformance.
23  Overall, we find that beating a market benchmark is a significant, discrete event only in the
pension segment.
4.3. The role of Jensen’s alpha in explaining flow in the two industries
Table 2 showed that Jensen’s alpha is significantly positively related to flow in both segments, a result
seemingly inconsistent with differences in financial sophistication across the two clienteles. Additional evidence in
Table 3 sheds light on this puzzling result by highlighting the differences in symmetry for managers performing
above and below the S&P 500 Index in the two segments. Panel A shows that the relation between pension
manager flow and Jensen’s alpha is positive, highly statistically significant, and approximately symmetric across
good and bad performance. Specifically, an additional 1% of alpha performance implies approximately an
additional 2% growth rate for pension managers performing both above and below the S&P 500.
24  The dollar
flow regression also indicates a positive relation with alpha, but the coefficient on alpha performance below the
                                                                
23 We do find that the coefficients on excess returns in the pension fund and mutual fund regressions are not significantly
different from each other. This may not  be surprising, however, in light of the large standard errors on the pension fund
coefficients.  Similar mixed results on the significance of OUTP for mutual funds occur in robustness checks where we delete
small funds, large funds, and add back expenses. The significance of outperforming a benchmark may also be driven by the
popularity of mutual fund “select lists.”
24 We find a very similar result when we use the same specification for a regression of flow measured by growth in the number
of clients. Specifically, an additional 1% of alpha performance implies an additional 3% client growth rate for pension managers
both above and below the S&P 500.21
S&P 500 is more than twice as large than the one above the S&P 500. However, this is driven by the largest
10% of pension managers since the coefficients also display symmetry when these managers are deleted.
Panel B shows that the symmetric impact of alpha in the pension industry does not extend to the mutual
fund industry. For example, in the percentage flow regression, the coefficient on alpha is three times larger in the
subsample of funds outperforming the S&P 500 than in the underperforming subsample. Alpha performance
apparently contributes positively and significantly to fund flows primarily when mutual fund managers outperform
the S&P 500, and do not seem to matter much for managers that underperform.
25   This result suggests that the
anomalous importance of alpha in the mutual fund segment documented in Table 2 appears to be primarily
driven by the huge impact of alpha at the top end of the mutual fund alpha distribution.
The statistical significance of a risk-adjusted performance measure in explaining mutual fund flow is also
reported in Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Gruber (1996). Both studies report a significant relation between
mutual fund flow and Jensen’s alpha, even after controlling for other performance measures. Furthermore, Sirri
and Tufano report a significantly higher coefficient in the top quintile of alpha performance relative to the other
quintiles, but provide little explanation for this result. Our focus on client sophistication posits that  the
importance of Jensen’s alpha to mutual fund investors is an anomaly and prompts us to investigate it further.
One way to reconcile the lack of sophistication on the part of mutual fund investors with the significance
of a risk-adjusted measure such as Jensen's alpha is to explore its relation with a commonly used summary
ranking measure—Morningstar’s coveted star rating.  For 1994, the only year for which we have star ratings
data, the correlation between stars and Jensen's alpha is 0.51.  Furthermore, there is a much higher correlation
of stars and alpha for funds outperforming the S&P 500 than for those underperforming (0.48 versus 0.16),
suggesting that alpha is a better proxy for stars within this group. Thus, the highly asymmetric importance of
alpha reported in Table 3 panel B supports the idea that star ratings may be driving the relation between flow
and alpha.
To investigate this further, we add the Morningstar star rating as an additional right hand side
performance variable to the regression specification of Table 2. Specifically, Table 4 contains the results of both
dollar and percentage 1994 flow regressions with alpha, lagged return,  tracking error, and star rating as
                                                                
25 The perverse negative coefficient on alpha for underperforming managers in the dollar flow regression is being driven by the
smallest mutual fund managers in our sample. When we delete managers with less than $250 million in assets, the coefficient
becomes insignificant. Overall, the importance of alpha for underperforming mutual funds is minimal.22
regressors.
26  Consistent with anecdotal evidence, the impact on mutual fund flow appears to be economically
significant as an additional star implies a higher growth rate of 17 percentage points, and additional dollar flow of
$34.6 million. While alpha is not statistically significant in either dollar flow specification, in the percentage flow
regression we find that the coefficient on alpha is no longer statistically significant when the star rating is added to
the regression. The effect of alpha appears to be subsumed by Morningstar’s star rating, which we interpret as
evidence that the anomalous importance of risk-adjusted performance measures may be the result of a
correlation with influential summary ranking measures.
4.4. Evidence on the importance of agency relationships in the pension industry segment
In Section 2, we argue that pension sponsor agency problems may underlie many aspects of the
manager selection process in the pension segment. While we cannot offer one direct test for the presence of
agency problems, three empirical results are collectively consistent with such an interpretation.  Agency
problems imply that sponsors value manager characteristics that reduce a corporate treasurer’s job risk.  In the
last section we argued that the importance of outperforming a benchmark in determining pension manager flow
might be due to a need for sponsors to have concrete validation of their choice of manager. In this section, we
discuss agency interpretations of two other results.
 First, tracking error may serve as a sponsor safety indicator since it measures a manager’s deviation
over time from a passive market benchmark. Managers with low tracking error may be considered safe choices
because they are unlikely to perform very differently than the passive benchmark.  Directing flow away from
high tracking error managers suggests that sponsors desire to avoid bad surprises at the cost of forgoing the
possibility of good surprises. The results in Table 2 support the expected negative relation between pension
manager flow and tracking error.  Table 3 sharpens the picture by indicating that tracking error is punished
significantly for pension fund managers that outperform the S&P 500, and not for those who underperform. This
implies that underperformance of the benchmark leads to the ultimate penalty of either loss of clients and flow,
                                                                
26 Ideally we would use star ratings for each year of our panel 1987-1994. However, this is not possible since many years of our
sample period pre-date the availability of star ratings in electronic CD or floppy disk form.  Historical star ratings are also not
available from Morningstar Inc directly since Morningstar applies any changes in star rating algorithms to all previous
periods, and hence the ratings available from them would not match the ratings available to investors in that previous time
period.  In a separate study, we are investigating the relation between mutual fund flow and star ratings from  1996 to 1999, a
period over which the same rating algorithm was used throughout.23
or being removed from the pool of potential hires. In other words, tracking error is not as relevant for
underperforming managers since the underperformance itself dominates the decision to retain or hire the
manager.  Under either a sophistication or agency interpretation, tracking error should not matter to mutual fund
investors, which is consistent with what we find in Tables 2 and 3.
Second, the strength of the relation between quantitative performance measures and manager flow also
has an agency interpretation.  If non-performance manager characteristics such as reputation and personality
serve to validate the selection of managers, then the relation between flow and performance should be weaker in
the pension fund segment than in the mutual fund segment.  The first row of Table 5 shows that with the same
right hand side performance variables, the mutual fund regression adjusted R
2 estimates are nearly three times
higher than the comparable pension fund estimates.  Performance variables alone explain only 2% of the cross-
sectional variation in pension fund dollar flows and only 5.6% of the variation in percentage flows. The
importance of client servicing in the pension fund industry and the fact that performance measures are often used
for screening purposes only, are both consistent with this result. Other potential reasons, however, for the
relatively weak statistical relation between pension flow and performance variables include noise introduced by
the liquidity needs of clients, differing investment horizons, or data quality issues.
4.5. The role of non-performance variables in explaining flow
Non-performance control variables, such as asset size and lagged flow have not received much attention
in the mutual fund flow-performance literature. Differences in the importance of these variables across the
segments offer interesting insights into the inner workings of the industry and, as we will argue in Section 6, have
implications for managerial incentives. Table 5 reports the proportion of flow explained solely by non-
performance control variables in the two segments. As a group, these variables appear to be very important in
explaining flow, with adjusted R
2 coefficients comparable to, or exceeding, the explanatory power of
performance variables. Panel B reports the estimated coefficients from these regressions in the two segments.
Differences in the autocorrelation of flows are economically significant and highly robust. Mutual fund
flows are highly autocorrelated, while pension fund flows display little to no autocorrelation. For example, the
last line of Panel A shows that lagged flows explain a negligible amount of the variation in pension dollar flows,
while they explain nearly half of the cross-sectional variation in mutual fund dollar flows. This implies that on24
average mutual funds that have attracted a high level of dollar flow, or a high asset growth rate, will continue to
do so in the future, all else equal. There is no such expectation for pension fund managers.
One explanation for the difference in autocorrelation is that there is some “herding” toward specific
managers in the mutual fund segment, but not in the pension segment. Alternatively, this difference may be
related to how managers are chosen and monitored over time in the two segments. Survey evidence shows that
most mutual fund investors are saving for retirement, holding funds for relatively long periods, and are net
contributors to their mutual fund accounts. Anecdotally, mutual fund investors tend to choose a fund, and then
continue to invest automatically for a number of years without much further scrutiny. If true, this effect would be
amplified by the growth in defined contribution (401k) plans that typically lock investors into a menu of funds or
complexes.
27  In contrast, pension fund sponsors are not net contributors to their accounts, rebalance their
portfolios regularly, and are purported to be more vigilant monitors, and so will not be shuttling money to the
same managers year after year.
If 401k participant behavior is related to the mutual fund flow autocorrelations, we might expect the
autocorrelations to be higher for funds with a large amount of 401k business. To test this, we supplement our
data with Pensions and Investments’ annual listing of the fifty funds with the largest 401k assets under
management.
28  We find that, on average, mutual funds attracting the most 401k dollars exhibit a higher
correlation between flow and lagged flow than the rest of the sample (not reported). In addition, within this
sample of funds with a large amount of 401k business, a fund’s correlation coefficient between flow and lagged
flow is significantly positively related to the percentage of fund assets from 401k accounts.  Thus, the limited
menu of choices typical of 401k plans, together with mechanical investment behavior on the part of participants,
may underlie the positive autocorrelation in this segment.
There are also significant differences in the relation between flow and asset size in the two segments.
The pension fund coefficients on asset size are negative, significant, and highly robust to alternative specifications
for both dollar and percentage flow. This indicates that pension managers that manage a large amount of assets
receive less flow and grow less quickly, all else equal. The mutual fund coefficients on asset size indicate that
managers attract flow approximately in proportion to their size. Thus, while large mutual fund managers
                                                                
27 Gruber (1996) conjectures that constraints on choices in retirement accounts contribute to autocorrelated flows in the mutual
fund industry. He also argues that the autocorrelation in flows may reflect unobservable differences in fund reputation and
services, or marketing effort.
28 Pensions and Investments magazine annual special report on mutual funds (2/8/93 p. 17, 2/7/94 p. 13, 3/6/95 p. 17).25
experience statistically significant higher dollar flow, large pension fund managers actually attract fewer dollars.
In fact, the largest 10% of pension fund managers in our sample experience large outflows while the largest 10%
of mutual fund managers experience large inflows.
The highly robust negative relation between pension manager asset size and flow may also be driven by
client behavior. For example, pension sponsors may believe that managers with large assets under management
will be unable to provide the level of service and personal attention individual sponsors require. Thus, the
importance of agency relationships and client servicing may drive the negative relation between flow and asset
size, inducing either clients to avoid large managers, or managers to stop taking clients above some threshold.
Alternatively, decreasing returns to scale may be driven by performance considerations. It may be more difficult
for managers to post good performance when assets under management grow too large due to price pressure
when buying and selling stocks. Pension fund sponsors may be aware of this indirect effect of size on
performance and steer money away from large managers.
5. Do pension fund sponsors punish poor performance with outflows?
Sirri and Tufano (1998) document that the flow-performance relation in the mutual fund industry is
highly convex. They conclude, “Mutual fund consumers chase returns, flocking to funds with the highest recent
returns, though failing to flee from poor performers (p. 1590).” In other words, managers appear to receive
large rewards in terms of increased flow for posting high returns, and little punishment even for severe
underperformance. This convexity of the flow-performance relation in the mutual fund industry has spawned a
growing literature including Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Busse (1998),
Koski and Pontiff (1999), Karceski (1999), and Chen and Pennachi (1999), some of which we discuss in the
next section. Adding pension fund manager data not only allows for a test of convexity on a new set of
managers, but also is an interesting test of client differences. Because pension sponsors are hypothesized to be
more vigilant and sophisticated monitors, we expect the shape of the flow-performance relation to be
significantly different from mutual funds.
29  Specifically, we expect pension sponsors to withdraw assets from
poorly performing managers, and not to flock to last year’s winners.
                                                                
29 We interpret the lack of punishment for poor performance among mutual funds as indicative of a lack of sophistication or
vigilance among individual investors. Tax considerations provide an alternative to this interpretation, since taxable mutual
fund investors might not liquidate poorly performing funds to avoid realizing taxable capital gains. Recent work by26
We first present evidence on convexity in the relation between flow and performance in the form of the
graphs depicted in Figures 1 through 4. Our methodology differs somewhat from that of Sirri and Tufano
(1998)’s Figure 1, which is a univariate plot of the relation between lagged return ranking and percentage flow.
Since we have shown that other performance and control variables are important, we use a multivariate
framework in creating the data for our graphs. Specifically, we rank managers by style objective and year to
form deciles according to a performance measure, either Jensen's alpha or lagged return. We then run a
piecewise linear regression over these deciles, while controlling for all variables included in the regression of
Table 2.
30  For example, to create Figure 1 depicting the relation between lagged return percentile ranking and
percentage flow, we first estimate coefficients on the lagged return deciles while controlling for alpha, tracking
error, asset size, etc. We then substitute average values for all included variables into the estimated regression
equation.  Thus, Figure 1 depicts the relation between expected flow and lagged return ranking for the average
manager observation. These figures sharpen the analysis in the tables by allowing for non-linear relations
between flow and the measures of performance.
 Figure 1 displays the familiar convexity result for the mutual fund industry. Top performing mutual funds
have large growth rates and poor performers have small, but positive growth rates.  Figure 2 depicts the
analogous results for alpha performance deciles and looks quite similar to Figure 1. The top 10% of mutual fund
managers ranked by lagged return performance, and the top 20% of managers ranked by alpha performance
attract disproportionate amounts of flow.  Compared to mutual funds, the flow-performance relation for pension
funds appears much less convex. Larger percentage growth rates start with funds above the 60th percentile
according to either performance measure, and flow is relatively more symmetric around zero across good and
bad performance. For example, pension managers appear to experience asset shrinkage when among the
bottom 20% of alpha performers.
31
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Bergstresser and Poterba (1999), who study fund inflows and outflows separately, provides some weak evidence in support of
this view. Although they find a significant negative relation between fund outflows and unrealized capital gains, tax and
performance variables explain only 2% of the variation in outflows. Interestingly, they find that most of the explanatory power
for the net version of flows studied in this literature comes from the strong relation between tax and performance variables and
inflows.
30 We also tested a model with decile dummies that allow for the intercept to change across deciles. The decile dummies were
insignificantly different from zero, so we dropped them from the final specification. We also repeated the analysis using
quintile and quartile specifications and find the deciles to be the most illustrative.
31 This result is strengthened if we delete the largest managers (the top 10% of managers ranked by asset size) suggesting that
the result is not merely a case of large funds losing assets.27
Several interesting comparisons emerge when we repeat the analysis for dollar flows. Figure 3 shows a
weakly convex pattern for mutual fund flows, with poor performers experiencing low dollar flow, and managers
above the 80th return percentile experiencing higher dollar flow.  A “lack of punishment” view is still evident for
mutual funds since poorly performing managers show small, but positive, inflows rather than outflows.
32  The
interesting contrast is for the pension fund sample.  The relation between dollar flow and performance in this
industry appears linear, with poor performers losing assets and top performers gaining assets. This is consistent
with our results in Table 2, where we do not include a dummy variable for outperformance of the S&P500.
Both the linear shape of this relation and the dollar outflows for poor performance are robust to repeating the
analysis on various subsamples of the data suggesting that pension sponsors do punish managers of poorly
performing funds by withdrawing assets.
33
Figure 4 aids in interpreting the results of Table 3 Panel A as evidence of punishment.  Specifically, this
table shows that the coefficient on alpha is significantly positive for both managers that performed above and
below the S&P 500. Moreover, a significantly positive coefficient on alpha is robust to an analysis of the
percentage change in the number of clients (client growth). This implies that higher alpha always increases dollar
flow, percentage flow, and client growth.  Figure 4 tells us that this result is not just a relative flow result; poor
alpha performance results in outflows and asset shrinkage. To confirm this, we analyzed the subset of managers
that underperformed the S&P 500 and divided this sample into the bottom-third and top-third alpha performers.
On average the low alpha group lost 3.6 clients while the top alpha group gained 0.4 clients. As a group, the
low alpha group experienced a net loss of 1,951 clients while the high alpha group experienced a net gain of
152 clients.
6. Implications for managerial incentives and risk shifting
Our empirical findings have implications for the incentives facing fund managers. Two recent papers
have tested one dimension of managerial incentives that derive from the flow-performance relation—the
                                                                
32 Low dollar growth, and therefore a low growth rate, may possibly be interpreted as punishment since these funds would
clearly be growing at a rate below the mutual fund industry during our sample period. Nevertheless, the interpretation in the
literature has been to equate punishment with outflows.
33 Specifically, the mutual fund and pension fund graphs respectively look very similar when we delete the top 10% of mutual
and pension managers ranked by asset size. In addition, we repeated the test on managers with $250 million or greater in
assets to have comparably sized managers for the mutual fund and pension fund samples. These graphs also do not appear
materially different.28
alteration of risk over the course of the year. Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison
(1997) use the convexity of the flow-performance relation as the fundamental feature of the tournament played
by mutual fund managers seeking to attract assets. Specifically, given the observed lack of punishment for poor
performance in conjunction with large flow gains for top performers, fund managers have an implicit incentive to
alter the risk of their portfolios to maximize the payoffs from this implicit contract. These authors find evidence
that mutual fund managers indeed respond to these implicit incentives and systematically alter the riskiness of
their portfolios during the last part of the year.
34  Do pension fund managers have the same incentive to risk-
shift? In this section we argue that the body of empirical evidence on the implicit and explicit incentives facing
pension managers suggests that they do not.
While the risk-shifting literature has focused on the implicit incentive derived from the shape of the flow-
performance relation, portfolio manager behavior is clearly also influenced by any explicit incentives, such as
contractual performance-based compensation. A further complication in this industry is that the observable
contractual arrangements are between the management firm and client, rather than between the management firm
and individual portfolio managers. Thus, while explicit performance-related incentives surely have the power to
influence portfolio manager behavior, the exact nature of these individual incentives is generally unobservable.
Aggregate data sources, however, suggest that these explicit incentives do not generally differ across the
pension and mutual fund segments.
The typical fee contract in both industry segments is a percentage of assets under management, without
an explicit performance component. Only 2.3% of mutual funds and 24.5% of pension fund sponsors use
performance-based fee contracts with their management firms.
35  While we cannot speak directly to the explicit
manager incentives provided by their employment contracts, surveys suggest that portfolio manager
compensation in both segments is commonly tied to firm-wide performance and asset-generation in addition to,
or instead of, portfolio return performance.
36  Other common components of manager compensation, such as
equity stakes, also serve to align the interests of portfolio managers and management firms toward the goal of
                                                                
34 Note that the empirical identification of risk-shifting behavior is somewhat controversial.  Busse (1998) and Koski and
Pontiff (1998) argue that the empirical relation between performance and risk are driven by methodology or mechanically by
flows, and is not the result of incentives. Chen and Pennachi (1999) provide an alternative test based on tracking error.
35 See Ackermann (1997) Table 1 and Institutional Investor PensionForum November 1997, p. 59.
36 According to the 1999 Investment Management Compensation Survey (AIMR) 57% of surveyed portfolio managers have
bonuses tied to firm-wide business performance, while 66% reported a bonus tied to individual portfolio performance (not
mutually exclusive categories).29
attracting assets.  In addition, Khorana (1996) finds that the probability of termination for a fund manager is
significantly negatively related to recent flow measured versus other funds with the same objective.   For these
reasons, we conclude that the explicit incentives of managers generally reinforce the implicit incentives from the
flow-performance relation. We now turn to the implicit incentives of pension managers.
Figures 1 through 4 in the previous section show that the shape of the flow-performance relation in the
pension segment materially differs from that of mutual funds. Specifically, we find that pension fund managers
risk losing a significant amount of flow if they take on diversifiable risk that does not pay off, but instead result in
low returns.  Increasing systematic risk is a similarly unattractive strategy since we find that outflows result from
poor market risk-adjusted performance.  In contrast to mutual funds, there is no disproportionate reward of
increased flow for being at the very top of the performance distribution.
The relatively weak statistical relation between performance variables and flow documented in Table 5
also weakens any performance-based incentives present for pension fund managers. With only 2% of the
variation in dollar flows explained by performance, managers do not have a large incentive to pursue any effort
intensive policies in an attempt to post good performance numbers.  The unobservable, qualitative manager
characteristics that dominate the attraction of clients and assets likely motivate managers to excel along these
dimensions. Manager actions that fit this category include increasing client services, such as the timeliness of
reporting, and increasing personal contact with clients.
37
The high level of monitoring common in the pension industry provides another disincentive for taking on
idiosyncratic risk in the hopes of winning the yearly tournament for assets. Anecdotal and survey evidence
suggest that sponsors and their hired consultants monitor their managers closely once hired, including checks on
whether the manager has deviated from his investment philosophy or style. It is not uncommon to dismiss a
manager for failing to stay within their investment guidelines, even when their performance is strong. Consistent
with this, according to a Greenwich Associates survey of sponsors terminating a manager in 1994, 26%
reported doing so for violation of a specific investment restriction. In sum, the linear and symmetric relation
between flow and performance, the relative importance of non-performance manager characteristics, and the
explicit punishment for deviating from investment policies, implies little incentive for pension managers to risk-
shift.
                                                                
37 Nelson/Wilshire Survey on Plan Sponsor Attitudes Toward Investment Manager Client Servicing, June 1997,
http://www.nelnet.com.30
Finally, the highly robust difference in the autocorrelation of pension and mutual fund flows has
implications for managerial incentives. The lack of autocorrelation for pension managers implies that they face
independent yearly tournaments to perform well and attract new business.  In contrast, high positive
autocorrelation in mutual fund flows implies that good performance in the current year translates into higher flow
next year, and in future years as well. Thus, high autocorrelation may strengthen mutual fund managers’
incentives to pursue portfolio strategies that post high returns or Morningstar ratings. On the other hand, a
steady stream of flow may provide a manager with a cushion, and therefore may reduce his incentive to
undertake effort-intensive portfolio strategies.
38  The opposing effects on incentives are not necessarily
contradictory, but rather imply that fund managers face different incentives at different stages in the life of the
fund. Consistent with this, the empirical risk-shifting literature incorporates the age and size of the funds in their
analysis. We point out that these fund attributes are positively related to a possibly more fundamental driver of
incentives, the autocorrelation in flow.
7. Conclusion
We document empirical differences in the flow-performance relation across the mutual fund and pension
fund industry segments that suggest that these managers operate in fundamentally different environments.  In
order to attract additional assets under management pension fund managers must exhibit a positive Jensen’s
alpha and low tracking error. Although lagged raw return initially appears to be an important determinant of
pension manager flow, further analysis in Table 3 reveals that this is explained by the presence of a benchmark
effect whereby outperformance of a benchmark index drives flow. While tracking error does not appear to be a
concern for mutual fund managers, we find a strong relation between mutual fund manager flow and both raw
returns and Jensen’s alpha.  The importance of a risk-adjusted performance measure appears anomalous in light
of a relatively unsophisticated mutual fund client base.  However, Table 4 shows that the relation between alpha
and flow is subsumed by a popular summary performance measure, Morningstar star ratings.  Overall, we find
supportive evidence that differences in the flow-performance relations are related to client differences across the
retail mutual fund and fiduciary pension fund segments.
                                                                
38 This may be especially true for fund managers that cater to the 401K market. According to Business Week, Stephen R.
Petersen, portfolio manager of the $9 Billion Fidelity Equity-Income fund, estimates that 75% of the monthly inflows to his
fund come from retirement plans. This steady source of flow has allowed him to operate with fewer cash holdings since “I
don’t get wild swings in cash flows or redemptions.”  (Business Week, 7/24/95, p. 76, “What’s Pumping Up Mutual Funds”)31
The results also paint an intriguing picture of the tournament structures under which managers make
portfolio decisions. The figures illustrate striking differences in the degree to which clients punish poorly
performing managers by withdrawing assets.  In contrast to mutual fund investors, pension fund sponsors punish
poorly performing managers by withdrawing assets under management. Recent literature focuses on the
incentive of mutual fund managers to alter the risk of their portfolios over time depending on their performance
relative to their peers.  Our evidence suggests that pension managers do not have a strong incentive to engage in
such risk-shifting, but a direct test for this behavior is necessary to resolve this issue. The contrast in incentives
across the two industry segments may lead to more powerful theories and tests of their effect on managerial
behavior, perhaps building on recent contributions by Admati and Pfleiderer (1997), Chen and Pennachi
(1999), and Cuoco and Kaniel (1998).
There is much work left to be done in understanding the money management industry. The explanation
underlying the observed negative relation between pension manager flow and asset size is unresolved.
Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (1998) interpret the same negative relation in the hedge fund industry from a
supply-side perspective. They argue that managers of large hedge funds are unwilling to accept new clients due
to the decreasing returns to scale feature of arbitrage strategies. We suggest an alternative, demand-side
interpretation.  It may be that investors consciously avoid large managers since they do not provide the desired
level of servicing or return performance.
Through our comparative study design we uncovered some issues in the mutual fund segment that also
deserve further study. Our comparison with the pension segment led us to identify the significance of Jensen’s
alpha to mutual fund investors as an anomaly, and the high degree of autocorrelation in mutual fund flows as
unique to this segment. We provide some preliminary evidence that these phenomena are related to behavior
specific to mutual fund investors, such as a reliance on widely-available summary ranking measures, and a
tendency to shuttle money to the same funds year after year without further scrutiny beyond the initial decision.
Our results suggest that these two influences are likely to significantly affect mutual fund flows, and as a result,
managerial incentives.32
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 Appendix: Description of Variables Used in the Regressions
Variable Description
Annual Dollar Flow The annual net flow in or out of a fund, where net flow
is defined as the annual change in total net assets
minus the appreciation in the funds assets. Assumes
cash flow occurs at the end of the year.
 Fit  =  TNAit – TNAit-1 (1 + Rit)
Annual Percentage Flow The annual net flow as a percentage of the total net
assets of the fund at the beginning of the year.
Annual Percentage Change in Number of Clients The number of clients in year t minus the number of
clients in year t-1, divided by the number of clients in
year t-1.
Lagged return Total annual return including reinvested dividends and
capital gains, lagged one year. For mutual fund
managers, the returns are net of management fees and
expenses, but gross of any load charges. For pension
fund managers, the returns are net of expenses but
gross of management fees.
Jensen’s alpha The annualized alpha observable at the beginning of
the year in which the flow is measured. This measure is
computed over the previous three-year period using
quarterly returns for pension funds and monthly returns
for mutual funds, and then annualized.
Excess Return Total annual return minus the return on the S&P 500
Index, lagged one year.
Tracking error Tracking error is the annualized standard deviation of
the residuals from a market model regression of
portfolio excess returns (versus the risk-free rate) on the
excess S&P500 return. This measure is computed over
the previous three year period, using quarterly returns
for pension funds and monthly returns for mutual
funds, and then annualized.
Dummy = 1 if outperformed the S&P500 Dummy equals one if the lagged annual return is higher
than the S&P500 return over the same period. Otherwise
the dummy equals zero.
Asset size Total assets of the fund at the beginning of the year in
which flow is measured (TNAit-1).
Length of track record (age) The number of years of previous consecutive returns.Table 1. Summary statistics of performance and non-performance manager characteristics in the 1987-1994 sample period.
Panel A. The 95
th through 5
th Percentiles in the pension fund manager and mutual fund manager distributions
This panel contains the distribution of manager characteristics in the pension fund and mutual fund industry segments over all manager-years used in the analysis of Tables 2-4.
The pension fund data is from the June 1995 M-Search Database, distributed by Mobius, Inc. The mutual fund database is from the July 1995 Mutual Funds OnDisc CD
distributed by Morningstar, Inc. These managers are from the actively managed domestic equity, domestic growth, and domestic value style categories only. There are 2,461
manager-years in the pension sample and 2,676 manager-years in the mutual fund sample. There are 562 individual pension managers and 483 individual mutual fund managers.
All flow and performance variables are on an annual basis and are defined in the Appendix. Due to a lack of pension fund fee data, pension manager returns are gross of
management fees, while the mutual fund manager returns are net of management fees and expenses.
Pension fund manager distribution Mutual fund manager distribution
95th 75th Median 25
th 5th 95th 75th Median 25th 5th
Assets under management
in $millions (asset size) 4465 936.5 299 102 29.5 2060.1 492.9 167.9 66.12 26.5







Dollar flow ($millions) 399.76 57.35 0.61 -50.49 -523.61 301.62 26.00 -1.74 -19.59 -108.95
Percentage flow 1.104 0.213 0.004 -0.143 -0.490 0.825 0.152 -0.018 -0.112 -0.273
Percentage change in
number of clients 1.00 0.25 0.021 -0.043 -0.344 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Performance measures:
Annual returns 0.451 0.256 0.151 0.064 -0.057 0.420 0.228 0.132 0.047 -0.076
Jensen’s alpha 0.094 0.034 0.006 -0.018 -0.063 0.088 0.020 -0.006 -0.033 -0.085
Tracking error 0.143 0.084 0.058 0.041 0.023 0.129 0.085 0.060 0.043 0.028
Excess return (S&P500) 0.190 0.067 0.015 -0.033 -0.111 0.167 0.048 -0.005 -0.055 -0.135
Pension funds Mutual funds
Percentage outperforming the S&P 500 Index: 58.4% 47.2%
Percentage with a five-year or longer track record: 78.9% 90.2%
                                                                
* Based on 1994 data only due to availability.Table 1. Summary statistics (continued)
The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels.



























































*** -0.021 -0.032 -0.203
*** -0.050
** -0.013






























































*** -0.015 0.006 -0.165
*** 0.012 -0.020 0.217
***Table 2. OLS regressions of pension fund and mutual fund manager flow on performance measures
This table reports the results of pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions of annual dollar flow and annual percentage flow (fund growth rates)
on manager characteristics for the sample of 2,461 pension fund manager-years and 2,676 mutual fund manager-years over the sample period 1987-
1994. These managers are from the actively managed domestic equity, growth, and value style categories only. All flow and performance variables
are on an annual basis and are defined in the Appendix. Each column represents a separate regression, and we include as regressors, but do not report,
asset size, lagged flow, fund age, as well as year (1988-1994) and style (growth, value) interaction dummies as control variables. We use the natural
log of asset size in the percentage flow regression and asset size in the dollar regression. T-statistics based on White standard errors are in
parentheses and N represents the number of manager-year observations. The symbols *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1%
level. The letters a, b, and c indicate that the pension fund manager coefficients are statistically different from the corresponding coefficients in the
mutual fund manager regression at the 10, 5, and 1% level.
Pension fund managers Mutual fund managers
Dollar Percentage Dollar Percentage
flow flow flow flow
Intercept 42.85 0.71
***, c -16.63 0.16
***












(2.55) (2.99) (4.48) (5.94)
Tracking error -629.93
***, c -0.70
*, c 80.50 1.21
***
(-2.65) (-1.93) (0.61) (2.82)
Control variables included
in each regression: Fund age, asset size, lagged flow, and year and style (growth, value)
interaction term dummies
Adjusted R-squared 0.118 0.108 0.503 0.237
N 2461 2461 2676 2676Table 3.  The importance of market benchmark performance measures
Panel A: The pension fund segment
This panel reports pooled, cross-sectional time-series regressions of percentage and dollar flow on excess
market returns and other performance measures for the pension fund sample only. To test the importance of
outperforming a benchmark, we estimate separate coefficients of each performance variable for those
managers outperforming the S&P 500 (above S&P500) and for those underperforming the S&P 500 (below
S&P 500). Specifically, we regress:
Where
i
t Z  is a vector of performance variables, 
i
t TS  is a vector of time-style dummy interactions, and 
i
t C
is a vector of control variables. OUTP is equal to one if the manager’s lagged return gross of management
fees is greater than the lagged return on the S&P 500, and zero otherwise. UNDERP is equal to one if the
manager’s lagged return gross of management fees is less than the lagged return on the S&P 500, and zero
otherwise. Excess return is defined as the manager’s lagged return less the lagged return on the S&P 500.
We include in the regressions, but do not report, asset size, lagged flow, and fund age, in addition to the
style (growth, value) and year (1988-1994) interaction dummies, as control variables. We use the natural
log of asset size in the percentage flow regression and asset size in the dollar regression. T-statistics based
on White standard errors are in parentheses and N represents the number of manager-year observations.
The symbols *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. The letters a, b, and c
indicate that the pension fund manager coefficients are statistically different from the corresponding
coefficients in the mutual fund manager regressions in Panel B at the 10, 5, and 1% level.
Dependent variable Dependent variable








Excess return (above S&P 500) 23.60 0.21
(0.33) (1.08)
Excess return (below S&P500) 223.68 0.23
(1.56) (1.53)
Jensen’s alpha (above S&P500) 781.37*** 2.13***
, c
(3.41) (4.36)
Jensen’s alpha (below S&P500) 1829.91***
, c 1.82***
(2.93) (4.05)




Tracking error (below S&P500) 247.43 -0.18
(0.59) (-0.36)
Control variables included: Fund age, asset size, lagged flow, and year
and style interaction dummies













t C TS Z UNDERP Z OUTP OUTP Flow e b b b b b b + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 * *Table 3.  The importance of market benchmark performance measures (continued)
Panel B: The mutual fund segment
This panel reports pooled, cross-sectional time-series regressions of percentage and dollar flow on excess
market returns and other performance measures for the mutual fund sample only. To test the importance of
outperforming a benchmark, we estimate separate coefficients of each performance variable for those
managers outperforming the S&P 500 (above S&P500) and for those underperforming the S&P 500 (below
S&P 500). Specifically, we regress:
Where
i
t Z  is a vector of performance variables, 
i
t TS  is a vector of time-style dummy interactions, and 
i
t C
is a vector of control variables. OUTP is equal to one if the manager’s lagged return net of management
fees is greater than the lagged return on the S&P 500, and zero otherwise. UNDERP is equal to one if the
manager’s lagged return net of management fees is less than the lagged return on the S&P 500, and zero
otherwise. Excess return is defined as the manager’s lagged return less the lagged return on the S&P 500.
We include in the regressions, but do not report, asset size, lagged flow, and fund age, in addition to the
style (growth, value) and year (1988-1994) interaction dummies, as control variables. We use the natural
log of asset size in the percentage flow regression and asset size in the dollar regression. T-statistics based
on White standard errors are in parentheses and N represents the number of manager-year observations.
The symbols *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level.
Dependent variable Dependent variable
Dollar flow Percentage flow
Intercept -42.08*** 0.14***
(-2.69) (3.04)
Outperform S&P500 Dummy 60.43** 0.07
(2.50) (1.50)
Excess return (above S&P 500) 126.70** 0.24*
(2.08) (1.90)
Excess return (below S&P500) 205.07*** 0.40***
(3.92) (3.93)
Jensen’s alpha (above S&P500) 878.40*** 4.60***
(4.58) (6.83)
Jensen’s alpha (below S&P500) -244.66* 1.41***
(-1.94) (5.25)
Tracking error (above S&P500) -199.72 1.12
(-0.84) (1.54)
Tracking error (below S&P500) 50.64 0.36
(0.37) (1.04)
Control variables included: Fund age, asset size, lagged flow, and year
and style interaction dummies













t C TS Z UNDERP Z OUTP OUTP Flow e b b b b b b + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 * *Table 4. Evidence on the importance of Morningstar star ratings in the mutual fund industry segment
This panel contains the coefficients from a regression of 1994 mutual fund flow on performance and non-performance manager
characteristics (control variables). Each column represents a separate regression using only 1994 mutual fund data from the July 1995
Mutual Funds OnDisc CD distributed by Morningstar, Inc. The Morningstar star rating ranges from one to five stars, with five stars
representing the highest rating. We include in the regressions, but do not report, asset size, lagged flow, fund age, and dummy
variables indicating whether the fund is managed in a growth or value style, as control variables. We use the natural log of asset size in
the percentage flow regressions and asset size in the dollar regressions. T-statistics based on White standard errors are in parentheses
and N represents the number of manager-year observations. The symbols *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and
1% level.
Dollar Dollar Percentage Percentage




(-1.86) (-3.11) (1.51) (-0.77)
Jensen’s alpha 222.39 -135.81 3.97
*** 2.21






(4.30) (4.19) (4.42) (3.97)
Tracking error -174.82 166.60 -2.64
** -1.11
(-0.37) (0.44) (-2.30) (-1.07)






Control variables included: Fund age, asset size, lagged flow,  and style (growth, value) dummies
Adjusted R-squared .659 0.662 0.230 0.264
N 419 419 419 419Table 5. The importance of non-performance manager characteristics
Panel A. An industry segment comparison of the explanatory power of performance and non-performance manager characteristics to
explain cross-sectional flow
This panel contains the adjusted R-squared under various regression specifications for the Pension Fund and Mutual Fund segments
(regressed separately). Column two lists the variables included in the regression. We use the natural log of asset size in the percentage
flow regressions and asset size in the dollar regressions.
Pension fund managers Mutual fund managers
Variables included in Dollar Percentage Dollar Percentage
the regression: flow flow flow flow
Quantitative performance
variables only:
Jensen’s alpha, lagged return,
tracking error, Outperform
S&P500 Dummy
0.020 0.056 0.058 0.143
Control Variables only: Asset size, lagged flow, length
of track record (age), time and
style interaction dummies
0.104 0.074 0.492 0.130
Quantitative performance and
control variables:
Both sets of performance and
control variables listed above. 0.122 0.116 0.504 0.240
Lagged flow only: Lagged dollar and percentage
flow respectively 0.0004 0.019 0.473 0.078Table 5. (continued)
Panel B. A comparison of the relation of flow to non-performance manager characteristics in the two industry segments
This panel contains the coefficients from a regression of flow in each segment on non-performance manager characteristics (control
variables). Each column represents a separate regression and we also include, but do not report, style (growth, value) and year (1988-
1994) interaction dummies as regressors. We use the natural log of asset size in the percentage flow regressions and asset size in the
dollar regressions. T-statistics based on White standard errors are in parentheses and N represents the number of manager-year
observations. The symbols *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level. The letters a, b, and c indicate that
these pension fund manager coefficients are statistically different from the corresponding coefficients in the mutual fund manager
regression at the 10, 5, and 1% level respectively. In the joint regression used to test the difference in pension fund and mutual fund
coefficients, we also interact a pension fund dummy with the time-style interaction terms (not reported).
Pension fund managers Mutual fund managers
Dollar Percentage Dollar Percentage
flow flow flow Flow
Intercept 38.92 0.77
***, c 12.56 0.19
***











(-4.89) (-10.02) (1.88) (-1.42)










Time and style (growth,value) interaction dummies are included.
Adjusted R-squared 0.104 0.074 0.492 0.130
N 2461 2461 2676 2676Figure 1. The Estimated Piecewise Linear Relation between Percentage Flow and
Return Ranking
To create this plot, we rank the lagged return of managers by style objective and year to form deciles. We
then estimate a piecewise linear regression over these deciles. In the same regression, we control for all
variables included in the regression of Table 2. We then substitute average values for all included variables
into the estimated regression equation.  Thus, Figure 1 depicts the relation between expected percentage
flow and lagged return ranking for the average manager observation.  
Figure 2. The Estimated Piecewise Linear Relation between Percentage Flow and
Jensen’s Alpha Ranking
To create this plot, we rank the Jensen’s alpha of managers by style objective and year to form deciles. We
then estimate a piecewise linear regression over these deciles. In the same regression, we control for all
variables included in the regression of Table 2. We then substitute average values for all included variables
into the estimated regression equation.  Thus, Figure 2 depicts the relation between expected percentage
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Mutual funds Pension fundsFigure 3. The Estimated Piecewise Linear Relation between Dollar Flow and Return
Ranking
To create this plot, we rank the lagged return of managers by style objective and year to form deciles. We
then estimate a piecewise linear regression over these deciles. In the same regression, we control for all
variables included in the regression of Table 2. We then substitute average values for all included variables
into the estimated regression equation.  Thus, Figure 3 depicts the relation between expected dollar flow
and lagged return ranking for the average manager observation.  
Figure 4. The Estimated Piecewise Linear Relation between Dollar Flow and Alpha
Ranking
 To create this plot, we rank Jensen’s alpha of managers by style objective and year to form deciles. We
then estimate a piecewise linear regression over these deciles. In the same regression, we control for all
variables included in the regression of Table 2. We then substitute average values for all included variables
into the estimated regression equation.  Thus, Figure 4 depicts the relation between expected dollar flow
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